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Abstract. We study the first-order primal infon logic. It is the
core of the policy language DKAL. We provide Gentzen-style cal-
culi for two versions of this logic that are not equivalent. For both
versions we investigate the semantics: one of them is a general-
ization of the so-called quasi-boolean semantics, the other one is
a Krypke-style semantics. We prove the completeness results and
the disjunction property for both logics.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the first-order primal infon logic. Primal infon logic
was introduced by Y. Gurevich and I. Neeman in [3] in connection with the
policy language DKAL (Distributed Knowledge Authorization Language) [1-3,
9].
In the primal infon logic every statement is considered as a piece of infor-
mation (infon) that is used in communication between agents. A conjunction of
infons ϕ∧ψ is considered as the least information containing both ϕ and ψ, an
implication ϕ→ ψ is understood as the least information from which an agent
can obtain ψ as soon as it knows ϕ.
For every principal p there is an infon p said ϕ. The intuitive meaning of
p said ϕ is that ϕ can be derived from the information sent by p. In the infon
logic, p said ϕ is considered as a modality satisfying the axioms of the modal
logic K. These modalities are sometimes called quotation modalities.
So far, the propositional primal infon logic was mostly studied. In [3] the
infon logic was introduced as the {∧,→}-fragment of the intuitionistic logic
extended by quotation modalities. For the reasons of efficiency the infon logic
was restricted to the so-called primal logic, a version of the intuitionistic logic
with a weak form of implication. Y. Gurevich and I. Neeman in [7] proved
that the derivability problem for the propositional primal logic is linear-time
decidable, and this result was extended by Y. Gurevich and C. Сotrini in [8]
to the primal logic with a weak form of disjunction and unrestricted quotation
modalities.
In [3] a Kripke-style semantics for the primal infon logic was introduced.
L. Beklemishev and Y. Gurevich [6] added disjunction to the language and
introduced a simpler semantics for the primal infon logic - the so-called quasi-
boolean semantics, which is a modification of the boolean semantics for the
classical logic.
The logic implemented in DKAL is in fact a weak form of the first-order
primal logic.
In this paper we investigate two versions of the first-order primal logic. We
would like to thank the referee of the previous version of this paper for find-
ing a mistake in it. Understanding the cause of the mistake led to discovering
that the two versions of the first-order primal logic differ from each other to
a greater extent than we thought. As it turns out, the two types of seman-
tics corresponding for the propositional primal logic behave differently in the
first order case. A natural generalization of the intuitionistic Kripke-style se-
mantics for the propositional primal logic corresponds to the extension of a
single-conclusion Gentzen-style calculus by the standard quantifier rules. On
the other hand, a natural generalization of the quasi-boolean semantics leads to
a stronger logic. This logic can be alternatively axiomatized either by a similar
extension of the multi-conclusion Gentzen-style calculus, or by adjoining to the
single-conclusion calculus the well-known constant domain principle:
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x). (1)
For both versions of predicate primal logic we prove soundness and com-
pleteness theorems by adapting the methods from [10].
The intuinionistic logic extended by (1) is sound and complete w.r.t. intu-
itionistic models with constant domains (Grzegorczyk’s models) ([15]). Unlike
for the primal version, there is no known axiomatization by a simple cut-free
Gentzen-style calculus for the intuitionistic logic of constant domains ([12, 16,
17]). The more complex axiomatizations of this logic can be found in [13, 14].
2 First-Order Primal Logic
Basic symbols of our language are: predicate symbols, constants, logical con-
nectives ⊤, ∧, ∨, →, ∀ and ∃ and disjoints sets of free and bound variables
(a, b, c, . . . and x, y, z, . . . , respectively). Formulas of the language are defined
in the standard way.
Notice that we consider the language without function symbols.
2.1 Natural Deduction Calculus
In this section we consider natural deduction calculus in sequential format from
[11].
We define the relation Γ ⊢ ϕ, formula ϕ is derivable from the set of hypothe-
ses Γ, as the minimal relation containing the following axioms and closed with
respect to the following inference rules:
Axioms:
⊢ ⊤ ϕ ⊢ ϕ
Rules:
(∧E)
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
(∧I)
Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
(∨I)
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
(∨E)
Γ, θ ⊢ ϕ Γ, ψ ⊢ ϕ Γ ⊢ θ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ
(→E)
Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
(→IW)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
(∀I)
Γ ⊢ ϕ(a)
Γ ⊢ ∀xϕ(x)
(∀E)
Γ ⊢ ∀xϕ(x)
Γ ⊢ ϕ[u/x]
where a 6∈ FreeV ar(Γ), u is a constant or a variable
(∃I)
Γ ⊢ ϕ[u/x]
Γ ⊢ ∃xϕ(x)
(∃E)
Γ ⊢ ∃xϕ(x) ∆, ϕ(a) ⊢ ψ
Γ,∆ ⊢ ψ
u is a constant or a variable, a 6∈ FreeV ar(Γ,∆)
(Weakening)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ
(Trans)
Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
This system is denoted QP; its propositional fragment is denoted P.
Notice that the deduction theorem fails for primal logic; for example, the
formula ∀xϕ(x)→ ∀xϕ(x) is not derivable in the primal logic.
We also consider primal logic with weak disjunction, which is obtained from
primal logic by removing the rule (∨E). The corresponding systems are denoted
QPW and PW.
2.2 Gentzen-Style Calculi
Sequents are objects of the form Γ⇒ ∆, where Γ,∆ are finite sets of formulas.
We consider two types of Gentzen-style calculus: multiple-conclusion format
and version where ∆ consists of exactly one formula. For reasons of brevity
we formulate the multiple-conclusion variant; to obtain the second one all rules
must be modified in such a way that the succedent consists of a single formula.
The axioms and rules of the first-order primal logic are standard except for
the rule (→Rp).
Axioms:
ϕ⇒ ϕ ⇒ ⊤
Rules:
(∧L)
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆
(∧R)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ∧ ψ
(∨L)
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
(∨R)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ∨ ψ
(→L)
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ, ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ∆
(→Rp)
Γ⇒ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ→ ψ,∆
(∀R)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(a)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀xϕ(x)
(∀L)
Γ, ϕ[u/x]⇒ ∆
Γ, ∀xϕ(x)⇒ ∆
where a 6∈ FreeV ar(Γ,∆), u is a
constant or a variable
(∃R)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[u/x]
Γ⇒ ∆, ∃xϕ(x)
(∃L)
Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
Γ, ∃xϕ(x)⇒ ∆
with the same constraints.
(Weakening)
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ,Γ1 ⇒ ∆,∆1
(Cut)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ϕ,Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
Γ,Γ1 ⇒ ∆,∆1
We denote this calculus QGPM; the corresponding propositional calculus is
denoted GPM.
To obtain a system with weak disjunction one must remove the rule (∨L).
The corresponding systems with weak disjunction are denoted QGPMW and
GPMW.
If we let the succedent consist of exactly one formula and replace the rule
(→L) with the following rule:
(→L)
Γ, ψ ⇒ θ Γ⇒ ϕ
Γ, ϕ→ ψ ⇒ θ
,
and the rule (∨R) with the following rule:
(∨R)
Γ⇒ ϕi
Γ⇒ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
, i = 1, 2,
we obtain the calculus that will be denoted QGP (GP for the propositional
variant, GPW and QGPW for systems with weak disjunction).
Unlike for the intuitionistic version of QGPM [12], for both QGPM and QGP
the cut-rule can be eliminated.
Theorem 1. A sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in QGPM iff it is derivable in
QGPM without the use of (Cut).
There are both syntactical and semantical proofs for Theorem 1. A syn-
tactical proof can be obtained by the standard techniques (for example, from
[10]). The only new reductions concern the weak implication rules and they
were considered in [6]. A semantical proof will be given in section 2.
Theorem 2. A sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in QGP iff it is derivable in QGP
without the use of (Cut).
A syntactical proof of this theorem can be obtained by the standard tech-
niques (for example, from [10]).
For the propositional case two formulated Gentzen-style calculi are equiva-
lent.
Proposition 3. A sequent Γ⇒
∨
∆ is derivable in GP iff Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable
in GPM.
For the first-order case only one implication holds:
Proposition 4. If a sequent Γ ⇒
∨
∆ is derivable in QGP then Γ ⇒ ∆ is
derivable in QGPM.
The converse is not true: we provide a counterexample. Recall that constant
domain principle is a schema
(CD) ∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x).
Lemma 5. Constant domain principle is derivable in QGPM but is not deriv-
able in QGP.
Proof. First we provide a derivation of constant domain principle in QGPM.
A⇒ A
A⇒ A,B(a)
B(a)⇒ B(a)
B(a)⇒ A,B(a)
A ∨B(a)⇒ A,B(a)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A,B(a)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A, ∀xB(x)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
Suppose that CD is derivable in QGP without (Cut).
Consider the lowermost rule application in the derivation. It could be (∀L)
or (∨R).
1. The lowermost rule application was (∀L):
A ∨B(u)⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
Two cases are possible:
(a) Before (∀L) (∨L) was applied:
A⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x) B(u)⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
A ∨B(u)⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
.
The right sequent is not derivable, for B(u) implies neither A nor
∀xB(x). So this case is impossible.
(b) Before (∀L) (∨R) was applied:
A ∨B(u)⇒ A
A ∨B(u)⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
or
A ∨B(u)⇒ ∀xB(x)
A ∨B(u)⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
But A ∨B(u) implies neither A nor ∀xB(x). Contradiction.
2. The lowermost rule application was (∨R):
(a)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ ∀xB(x)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
Before (∨R) could be (∀L) or (∀R):
A ∨B(u)⇒ ∀xB(x)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ ∀xB(x)
or
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ B(a)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ ∀xB(x)
It can be easily shown that neither can be the case.
(b)
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
In this case before (∨R) (∀L) was applied:
A ∨B(u)⇒ A
∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A
This cannot be the case.
Contradiction.
Actually, if we add constant domain principle to QGP we obtain exactly QGPM:
Theorem 6. QGPM ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆ iff QGP+(CD) ⊢ Γ⇒
∨
∆.
Proof. The implication form right to left is obvious.
We prove the converse by induction on the derivation of Γ⇒ ∆.
Consider the lowermost rule application in the given derivation. The rules
(∧L), (∨L), (∀L) and (∃L) are the same in QGPM and QGP.
Consider the case when the lowermost rule application was (∀R) (actually,
this is the only interesting case):
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(a)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀xϕ(x)
,
where a 6∈ FreeV ar(Γ,∆).
Let δ =
∨
∆.
By induction hypothesis QGP ⊢ Γ ⇒ δ ∨ ϕ(a). We have to prove that
QGP ⊢ Γ⇒ δ ∨ ∀xϕ(x).
Γ⇒ δ ∨ ϕ(a)
Γ⇒ ∀x(δ ∨ ϕ(x)) ∀x(δ ∨ ϕ(x))⇒ δ ∨ ∀xϕ(x) (CD)
Γ⇒ δ ∨ ∀xϕ(x)
Consider the case when the lowermost rule application was (→L):
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ, ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ∆
Let δ =
∨
∆.
By induction hypothesis QGP ⊢ Γ, ψ ⇒ δ and QGP ⊢ Γ⇒ δ ∨ ϕ. We have
to prove that QGP ⊢ Γ, ϕ→ ψ ⇒ δ.
Γ, ψ ⇒ δ Γ⇒ δ ∨ ϕ
Γ, (δ ∨ ϕ)→ ψ ⇒ δ
Γ, ψ ⇒ ψ
Γ, ψ ⇒ ϕ→ ψ Γ⇒ δ ∨ ϕ
Γ, (δ ∨ ϕ)→ ψ ⇒ ϕ→ ψ
Γ, ϕ→ ψ ⇒ δ
Other cases are similar.
It turns out that QGP is equivalent to the natural deduction calculus QP
and QGPM is not (since QGPM and QGP are not equivalent).
Theorem 7. Γ ⊢ ϕ is derivable in QP iff Γ⇒ ϕ is derivable in QGP.
Proof. We prove both implications by induction on the derivation.
Suggest QGP ⊢ Γ ⇒ ϕ. We consider the case when the lowermost applica-
tion of a derivation rule was (∃L); other cases are similar or trivial.
Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ψ
Γ, ∃xϕ(x)⇒ ψ
By induction hypothesis Γ, ϕ(a) ⊢ ψ is derivable in QP. So we can derive
(∃E)
∃xϕ(x) ⊢ ∃xϕ(x) Γ, ϕ(a) ⊢ ψ
Γ, ∃xϕ(x) ⊢ ψ
Now suggest Γ ⊢ ϕ in QP. Consider the case when the lowermost rule appli-
cation was (∃E); other cases are similar or trivial.
Γ ⊢ ∃xϕ(x) ∆, ϕ(a) ⊢ ψ
Γ,∆ ⊢ ψ
By induction hypothesis Γ ⇒ ∃xϕ(x) and ∆, ϕ(a) ⇒ ψ are derivable in QGP.
By applying (∃L) and (Cut), we obtain Γ,∆⇒ ψ.
3 Semantics
Y.Gurevich, I.Neeman [5] introduced a Kripke-style semantics for the primal
logic without disjunction. It is based on the notion of cone in a Kripke model and
in fact is a modification of the standard Kripke semantics for the intuitionistic
logic. A simpler semantics for the propositional primal logic with or without
disjunction, the so-called quasi-boolean models, was introduced in [6]. It can
be considered as a non-deterministic modification of boolean valuations for the
classical logic.
In this section we consider a natural generalization of quasi-boolean models
to the first-order logic. We show that QGPM is sound and complete with respect
to this semantics. However, QGP turns out to be sound but incomplete with
respect to the quasi-boolean semantics. We introduce an extension of Kripke
models from [5] to the first-order logic and show that QGP is sound and complete
with respect to it.
3.1 First-Order Quasi-boolean Semantics
In this section we provide a natural generalization of quasi-boolean models to
the first-order logic. For the definitions of quasi-boolean semantics in the propo-
sitional case see [6].
A first-order quasi-boolean model is a pair M = (M, v), where v is a quasi-
boolean valuation that assigns 0 or 1 to all closed atomic formulas and to all
formulas of the form ϕ → ψ, M 6= ∅, for every constant c its interpretation
c˜ ∈M is specified.
The forcing relation M v (we will denote it M ) naturally extends the
valuation to all formulas:
1. M  ϕ⇔ v(ϕ) = 1, where ϕ is a closed atomic formula or an implication;
2. M  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M  ϕ and M  ψ;
3. M  ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ M  ϕ or M  ψ;
4. M  ∀xϕ(x)⇔ ∀u ∈M M  ϕ[u/x];
5. M  ∃xϕ(x)⇔ ∃u ∈M M  ϕ[u/x].
We say that a valuation v is quasi-boolean, if the following conditions hold
for every implication ϕ→ ψ:
1. If M  ψ, then M  ϕ→ ψ;
2. If M  ϕ→ ψ, then either M 6 ϕ or M  ψ.
We add a new variable c¯ for every c ∈ M to our language. We say that
Γ(~a) ⇒ ∆(~a), where ~a is a vector of free variables, is valid in M iff for all
~u ∈M
M 
∧
Γ[~¯u/~a] implies M 
∨
∆[~¯u/~a].
(We consider the valuation of the empty-set be 0.)
QGPM is sound and complete with respect to the first-order quasi-boolean
semantics.
Theorem 8. If Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in QGPM then Γ ⇒ ∆ is valid in every
first-order quasi-boolean model.
Now we prove the completeness adapting the method from [10].
Theorem 9. If Γ ⇒ ∆ is not derivable in QGPM without the use of (Cut)
then there is a first-order quasi-boolean model such that Γ ⇒ ∆ is not valid in
it.
Proof. See appendix.
Now we can prove Theorem 1.
Corollary. A sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in QGPM iff it is derivable in QGPM
without the use of (Cut).
Proof. Consider Γ ⇒ ∆ that is not derivable in QGPM without the use of
(Cut). By theorem 9, there is a first-order quasi-boolean model M such that
Γ⇒ ∆ is not valid in it. By theorem 8, Γ⇒ ∆ is not derivable in QGPM (if it
was, it would be valid in M).
Remark. It is easy to prove that QGP is sound with respect to the first-
order quasi-boolean models. However, the completeness does not hold: the
constant domain principle
(CD) ∀x(A ∨B(x))⇒ A ∨ ∀xB(x)
is valid in every first-order quasi-boolean model, but is not derivable in QGP.
3.2 Semantics for QGP
In this section we introduce Kripke models for the single-conclusion variant of
the first-order primal logic. These are Kripke models for the first-order in-
tuitionistic logic with a special condition on forcing for implications (and for
disjunctions, is case of the logic with weak disjunction).
A Kripke model for the first-order primal logic QGPM is a tuple
W = 〈W,6, D, ν〉 such that
1. (W,6) is a non-empty partially ordered set;
2. D is a function assigning non-empty sets to the elements of W such that
∀u, v ∈ W (u 6 v ⇒ D(u) ⊆ D(v));
3. ν is a map assigning 0 and 1 to tuples 〈u, ϕ(c1, . . . , cn)〉, u ∈ W, c˜i ∈
D(u), ϕ is a closed atomic formula or an implication; ∀u, v ∈W (u 6 v ⇒
(ν(〈u, ϕ(c1, . . . , cn)〉 = 1⇒ ν(〈v, ϕ(c1, . . . , cn)〉 = 1).
The relation W , u  ϕ is defined as follows:
1. W , u  ϕ iff ν(u, ϕ) = 1 for closed atomic formulas and implications;
2. W , u  ⊤;
3. W , u  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ (W , u  ϕ and W , u  ψ);
4. W , u  ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ (W , u  ϕ or W , u  ψ);
5. W , u  ∃xϕ(x)⇔ (∃c ∈ D(u) (W , u  ϕ[c/x]));
6. W , u  ∀xϕ(x)⇔ (∀v > u (∀c ∈ D(v)W , v  ϕ[c/x])).
Also W , u  ϕ should satisfy the following conditions:
1. W , u  ψ ⇒W , u  ϕ→ ψ;
2. W , u  ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ∀v > u (W , v 6 ϕ or W , v  ψ).
We add a new variable for every constant c ∈
⋃
u∈W D(u) and denote it c¯.
We say that Γ(~a)⇒ ϕ(~a) is valid in W iff
∀u ∈W ∀~c ∈ D(u) (W , u 
∧
Γ(~¯c)⇒W , u  ϕ(~¯c)).
Remark. To obtain a Kripke model for the first-order primal logic with
weak disjunction (a WD-model) replace 4. with
4′.W , u  ϕi ⇒W , u  ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, i = 1, 2.
QGP is sound and complete with respect to Kripke models. The proof of
soundness is routine; to prove completeness it is convenient to consider natural
Theorem 10 (Soundness). If a sequent Γ⇒ ϕ is derivable in QGP then Γ⇒ ϕ
is valid in every Kripke model W.
Theorem 11 (Completeness). If a sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ is valid in every Kripke
model, then Γ ⊢ ϕ is derivable in QP.
Proof. The proof is similar to the standard proof of completeness for intu-
itionistic logic. We prove that if Γ 6⊢ ϕ then there is a Kripke model W such
that W 6 Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Let C be a set of constants. A set of sentences Γ is C-saturated, iff
1. Γ ⊢ ψ implies ψ ∈ Γ;
2. Γ ⊢ α ∨ β implies α ∈ Γ or β ∈ Γ;
3. If Γ ⊢ ∃xψ(x) then for some c ∈ C ψ(c) ∈ Γ.
Lemma 12. Suppose Γ 6⊢ ϕ, Γ, ϕ in a language L. Let C = {c0, c1, c2, . . . } be
a countable set of constants not in L, and let L(C) be L extended with C. Then
there is a C-saturated Γ′ such that Γ ⊆ Γ′ and Γ′ 6⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Let ψn be the numeration of all formulas in the extended language
L(C). We construct the sequence of sets of formulas Γn:
1. Γ0 = Γ.
2. For n > 0 several cases are possible:
(a) ψn 6∈ Γn and Γn, ψn 6⊢ ϕ. Then Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ψn}.
(b) ψn ∈ Γ and ψn has the form θ1 ∨ θ2. For some i ∈ {1, 2} Γn, θi 6⊢ ϕ
(otherwise Γn ⊢ ϕ). Fix this i and let Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {θi}.
(c) ψn ∈ Γ and ψn has the form ∃xθ(x). Let ci be the first constant from
C such that ci 6∈ FreeV ar(Γn). Let Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {θ(ci)}.
(d) Otherwise Γn+1 = Γn.
Now we define canonical model for the primal logic.
Let C0, C1, . . . be countable disjoint sets of constants: Ci = {ci0, ci1, . . . },
all cij 6∈ L. We write C
n for C0 ∪C1 ∪ · · · ∪Cn.
Canonical model W is a tuple 〈W,6, D, ν〉, where
1. W is a set of Γ′ ⊇ Γ such that L(Γ′) = L ∪ Cn for some n and Γ′ is
Cn-saturated;
2. Γ′ 6 Γ˜⇔ Γ′ ⊆ Γ˜;
3. if L(Γ′) = L ∪ Cn and Γ′ is Cn-saturated then D(Γ′) = Cn;
4. ν(ψ) = 1⇔ ψ ∈ Γ for closed atomic formulas and implications.
Lemma 13. For every Γ′ ∈ W and any sentence ψ of L(D(Γ′))
Γ′  ψ ⇔ ψ ∈ Γ′.
Proof. We prove this by induction on ψ.
If ψ is atomic or an implication, the condition holds by definition.
For ψ = α ∧ β it is obvious.
If ψ = α ∨ β, then Γ′  α ∨ β ⇔ (Γ′  α or Γ′  β) ⇔ (α ∈ Γ′ or β ∈ Γ′)⇔
((α ∨ β) ∈ Γ′) since Γ′ is D(Γ′)-saturated.
For ψ = ∃xβ(x) the condition holds by saturation properties.
Let ψ = ∀xβ(x). Suppose Γ′  ψ but ψ 6∈ Γ′ (Γ′ is Cn-saturated). For any
c ∈ Cn+1, Γ
′ 6⊢ β(c). By Lemma 12 there is a Cn+1-saturated Γ˜ ⊇ Γ′ such that
Γ˜ 6⊢ β(c). Hence Γ˜ 6 β(c). Contradiction with Γ′  ∀xβ(x).
If ψ ∈ Γ′, it is trivial to show that Γ′  ψ.
Lemma 14. The forcing relation Γ′  ψ is quasi-boolean.
Proof. If Γ′  β then β ∈ Γ′. Hence α → β ∈ Γ′ ⇔ Γ′  α → β by
definition.
If Γ′  α→ β then ∀Γ˜ > Γ′ Γ˜  α→ β by monotonicity. If now Γ˜  α, then
both α ∧ β and α are in Γ˜, hence β ∈ Γ˜ and so Γ˜  β.
Now we finish the proof of completeness. For our Γ 6⊢ ϕ there is a Cn-
saturated Γ′ such that Γ ⊆ Γ′ and Γ 6⊢ ϕ. So in our model Γ′ 6 ϕ.
Note that we can make a rooted model from ours: we have to leave only the
Γ′-cone, that is, all Γ˜ > Γ′. This cone is still a Kripke model.
Remark. To prove that QPW is complete with respect to WD-models
one has to make a little change in the proof of the previous theorem: remove
condition 3 from the definition of a C-saturated set and change the definition
of valuation v in the canonical model: v(ψ) = 1 ⇔ ψ ∈ Γ′ for closed atomic
formulas, implications and disjunctions.
3.3 Disjunction Property
In this section we prove the disjunction property for both QGP and QGPM.
Recall that the set of Harrop formulas is defined by the following grammar:
H = ⊤|A|H ∧H |B → H |∀xH(x),
where A is an atomic formula, B is a formula.
Theorem 15 (Disjunction property). Let L be any of the logics QGP or QGPM.
If Γ is a set of Harrop formulas and L ⊢ Γ ⇒ α ∨ β, then L ⊢ Γ ⇒ α or
L ⊢ Γ⇒ β.
Proof. For any set of formulas Γ we define a first-order quasi-boolean model
M = (M, v) as follows:
1. M = Const(Γ) ∪ Const(α) ∪ Const(β) ∪ {a}, where a is a new constant;
2. If ϕ is atomic then v(ϕ) = 1⇔ QGPM ⊢ Γ⇒ ϕ;
3. v(ϕ→ ψ) = 1⇔ (L ⊢ Γ⇒ (ϕ→ ψ) and (M 6 ϕ orM  ψ)).
Lemma 16. If M  ϕ then L ⊢ Γ⇒ ϕ.
Proof. We prove this by induction on ϕ. The only interesting case is ϕ =
∀xψ(x).
Let M  ∀xψ(x). Then ∀c ∈ M M  ψ(c), so M  ψ(a). By induction
hypothesis L ⊢ Γ⇒ ψ(a). Since a is a new constant, L ⊢ Γ⇒ ∀xψ(x).
Lemma 17. Valuation v is quasi-boolean.
Proof. If M  ψ, then L ⊢ Γ ⇒ ψ. Then L ⊢ Γ ⇒ ϕ → ψ and so the
right-hand side of condition 3 holds. So by condition 3 M  ϕ→ ψ.
If M  ϕ→ ψ, then by condition 3 M 6 ϕ or M  ψ.
Lemma 18. If ϕ is Harrop, then M  ϕ⇔ L ⊢ Γ⇒ ϕ.
Proof. The implication from left to right holds by lemma 16.
We prove the converse by induction on ϕ. We consider the cases when ϕ is
an implication or ∀xψ(x); other cases are trivial.
Let ϕ = θ → ψ, ψ ∈ H , L ⊢ Γ ⇒ θ → ψ. We have to show that M 6 θ or
M  ψ. Suppose M  θ. Then L ⊢ Γ ⇒ θ, so L ⊢ Γ ⇒ ψ. Since ψ is Harrop,
by the induction hypothesis M  ψ.
Let ϕ = ∀xψ(x), ψ ∈ H , L ⊢ Γ⇒ ∀xψ(x). For every c ∈M L ⊢ Γ⇒ ψ(c).
By the induction hypothesis ∀c ∈M M  ψ(c), so M  ∀xψ(x). Now we
finish the proof of the disjunction property. Recall that both QGP and QGPM
are sound with respect to first-order quasi-boolean models.
By lemma 18 if θ ∈ Γ thenM  θ. Since L ⊢ α∨β, by soundnessM  α∨β.
Hence M  α or M  β. By lemma 16 L ⊢ Γ⇒ α or L ⊢ Γ⇒ β.
4 Conclusion
We considered two first-order variants of the primal logic and introduced se-
mantics for both of them. We proved the cut-elimination and completeness for
both logics. However, the weaker one, QGP, seems to be more appropriate for
the primal logic. The stronger one, QGPM, corresponds to an unlikely situation
when all the agents have the same domain and know about that.
From the semantical point of view QGP is more like intuitionistic logic when
QGPM is more like classical logic. However, the disjunction property holds for
both of them.
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Appendix
We give a sketch of a syntactical proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. A sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in QGP iff it is derivable in QGP
without the use of (Cut).
Proof. We follow the standard procedure due to Gentzen.
Consider an application of a cut-rule d. We define its grade g(d) = |θ| + 1,
where θ is the cut-formula in d, and |θ| is the height of its parse tree. The rank
r(d) is the sum of heights of the right and left proof subtrees of the proof-tree
ending with d. The proof goes by induction on the grade and a subsidiary
induction on the rank of d.
Consider the cut-rule with maximum grade. If there are several such rules,
take the one with maximum rank and the leftmost of them.
It the cut-formula was not introduced on both sides of the proof tree imme-
diately before the cut, it is easy to obtain a proof tree where this cut will have
lower rank.
Consider the case when the cut-formula was introduced on both sides of the
proof tree immediately before the cut. We consider the only special case when
the cut-formula has the form α→ β; other cases are standard.
Γ⇒ β
Γ⇒ α→ β
Γ1, β ⇒ θ Γ⇒ α
Γ1, α→ β ⇒ θ
Γ,Γ1 ⇒ θ
We reduce it to a proof
Γ⇒ β Γ1, β ⇒ θ
Γ,Γ1 ⇒ θ
with a cut-rule with lower rank and lower grade.
Now we prove theorem 9.
Theorem 9. If Γ ⇒ ∆ is not derivable in QGPM without the use of (Cut)
then there is a first-order quasi-boolean model such that Γ ⇒ ∆ is not valid in
it.
Proof. For the proof of this theorem we need the notion of the reduction
tree. A sequent is written in every node of the tree. We say that a free variable
is available if it appears in some sequent on some step. We define the process
of building the reduction tree of Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 as follows:
Step 0. We write Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 in the root of the tree.
Step k, k > 0. Two cases are possible:
(a) In every leaf of the tree antecedent and succedent have a common
formula. The process is complete.
(b) Let Γ ⇒ ∆ be a sequent written in some leaf of the tree such that
Γ ∩∆ = ∅. 11 cases are possible:
k ≡ 0 (mod 11)
Let ϕ1 ∧ψ1, . . . , ϕn ∧ψn be all the conjunctions in Γ such that reductions
have not been applied to them on the previous steps. We add a node
above Γ⇒ ∆ and write there the sequent
ϕ1, . . . ϕn,Γ⇒ ψ1, . . . , ψn,∆
We say that a (∧L) reduction was applied to ϕ1 ∧ ψ1, . . . , ϕn ∧ ψn.
k ≡ 1 (mod 11)
Let ϕ1∧ψ1, . . . , ϕn ∧ψn be all the conjunctions in ∆ such that reductions
have not been applied to them on the previous steps. We add 2n nodes
above Γ⇒ ∆ and write there all the sequents
Γ⇒ θ1, . . . , θn,
where θi is either ϕi or ψi.
We say that a (∧R) reduction was applied to ϕ1 ∧ ψ1, . . . , ϕn ∧ ψn.
k ≡ 2 (mod 11)
Let ϕ1 ∨ ψ1, . . . , ϕn ∨ ψn be all the disjunctions in Γ such that reductions
have not been applied to them on the previous steps. This case of (∨L) is
similar to (∧R) reduction.
k ≡ 3 (mod 11)
Let ϕ1 ∨ψ1, . . . , ϕn ∨ψn be all the disjunctions in ∆ such that reductions
have not been applied to them on the previous steps. This case of (∨R)
is similar to (∧L) reduction.
k ≡ 4 (mod 11)
Let ϕ1 → ψ1, . . . , ϕn → ψn be all the implications in Γ such that reduc-
tions have not been applied to them on the previous steps. We add S(n, 2)
nodes above Γ⇒ ∆ and write there all the sequents
ψi1 , . . . , ψik ,Γ⇒ ϕj1 , . . . , ϕjl ,∆,
where {{i1 . . . ik}, {j1 . . . jl}} is a partition of the set {1 . . . n)}.
We say that a (→L) reduction was applied to ϕ1 → ψ1, . . . , ϕn → ψn.
k ≡ 5 (mod 11)
Let ϕ1 → ψ1, . . . , ϕn → ψn be all the implications in ∆ such that reduc-
tions have not been applied to them on the previous steps. We add a node
above Γ⇒ ∆ and write there
Γ⇒ ψ1, . . . , ψn,∆.
We say that a (→R) reduction was applied to ϕ1 → ψ1, . . . , ϕn → ψn.
k ≡ 6 (mod 11)
Let ∀xiϕi(xi) be all the formulas of the form ∀xϕ(x) in Γ.
For every i, let ai be the first available variable, that was not used in a
reduction of ∀xiϕi(xi) before. If there is no such available variable, take
first free variable that is not available and mark it as available.
We add a node above Γ⇒ ∆ and write there
ϕ1(a1), . . . , ϕn(an),Γ⇒ ∆.
k ≡ 7 (mod 11)
Let ∀xiϕi(xi) be all the formulas of the form ∀xϕ(x) in ∆ such that
reductions have not been applied to them on the previous steps.
Let a1 . . . an be the first not available variables. We add a node above
Γ⇒ ∆ and write there
Γ⇒ ϕ1(a1), . . . , ϕn(an),∆.
k ≡ 8 (mod 11)
Let ∃xiϕi(xi) be all the formulas of the form ∃xϕ(x) in Γ such that re-
ductions have not been applied to them on the previous steps.
Let a1 . . . an be the first not available variables. We add a node above
Γ⇒ ∆ and write there
ϕ1(a1), . . . , ϕn(an),Γ⇒ ∆.
k ≡ 9 (mod 11)
Let ∃xiϕi(xi) be all the formulas of the form ∃xϕ(x) in ∆.
For every i, let ai be the first available variable, that was not used in a
reduction of ∃xiϕi(xi) before. If there is no such available variable, take
first free variable that is not available and mark it as available.
We add a node above Γ⇒ ∆ and write there
Γ⇒ ϕ1(a1), . . . , ϕn(an),∆.
k ≡ 10 (mod 11)
If Γ and ∆ have no common formulas, we add a node above and write
there Γ⇒ ∆.
It can easily be seen that if every branch of the reduction tree is finite, the
sequent is derivable in QGPM.
So if a sequent is not derivable, there is an infinite branch in its reduction
tree. Take this branch and denote Γ˜ as the union of all antecedents of the
sequents written on the nodes of this branch; ∆˜ - the union of all succedents.
Now we define the model: let M be the set of all free variables.
The valuation v is defined by induction on the complexity of formulas. The
complexity measures the number of implications:
1. c(ϕ) = 0, if ϕ is atomic;
2. c(ϕ ∧ ψ) = c(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max{c(ϕ), c(ψ), };
3. c(ϕ→ ψ) = c(ψ) + 1;
4. c(∀xϕ[x/a]) = c(∃xϕ[x/a]) = c(ϕ(a)).
Now we define partial n-valuations vn assigning 0 and 1 to atomic formulas and
implications of complexity at most n. For every vn, the forcing relation n ϕ is
defined as usual for all formulas of complexity at most n.
For every n,
1. vn(ϕ) = 1⇔ ϕ ∈ Γ˜, if ϕ is atomic;
2. vn(ϕ→ ψ) = 1⇔ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∈ Γ˜ or n−1 ψ), if c(ϕ→ ψ) 6 n.
Since partial valuations vn extend each other, as a limit of vn we obtain the
valuation v (and the relation  ϕ) on all closed formulas such that
1. v(ϕ) = 1⇔ ϕ ∈ Γ˜, if ϕ is atomic;
2. v(ϕ→ ψ) = 1⇔ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∈ Γ˜ or  ψ).
This automatically means that if ϕ ∈ ∆, then v(ϕ) = 0 for atomic ϕ and
implications (because Γ ∩∆ = ∅).
Lemma 19. For every formula ϕ,
1. If ϕ ∈
⋃
Γ, then v ϕ;
2. If ϕ ∈
⋃
∆, then 6v ϕ.
Proof. We prove this by induction on ϕ.
If ϕ is atomic or an implication, we have (1) and (2) by definition. If ϕ is a
conjunction or a disjunction, the proof is trivial.
If ∀xψ(x) ∈ Γ˜ then for all a ∈ M ψ(a) was added to Γ˜ on some step. So
∀a ∈M  ψ(a) by induction hypothesis.
If ∀xψ(x) ∈ ∆˜ than for some a ∈M ψ(a) was added to ∆˜ on some step. So
∀a ∈M 6 ψ(a) by induction hypothesis.
For ϕ = ∃xψ(x) the proof is similar.
Lemma 20. Valuation v is quasi-boolean.
Proof. We prove that  ψ ⇒ ϕ⇒ ψ and v ϕ→ ψ ⇒6v ϕ or v ϕ.
Let  ψ. Then ψ 6∈ ∆˜, so ϕ→ ψ 6∈ ∆˜. Two cases are possible:
1. ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ˜. Then v(ϕ→ ψ) = 1 by definition.
2. ϕ → ψ 6∈ Γ˜. Then by definition v(ϕ → ψ) = 1 iff  ψ iff ψ ∈ Γ˜. So
v(ϕ→ ψ) = 1.
Let v ϕ→ ψ. Again two cases are possible:
1. ϕ → ψ ∈
⋃
Γ. Therefore, ϕ ∈ ∆ or ψ ∈ Γ. If ψ ∈ Γ, by the definition
v ψ. If ϕ ∈ ∆, 6v ϕ.
2. ϕ→ ψ 6∈
⋃
Γ. Since ϕ→ ψ 6∈
⋃
∆, v(ϕ→ ψ) = v(ψ). So v ψ.
Now we can prove completeness. If Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 is not derivable in QGPM,
take the model built from its reduction tree. Every formula from Γ0 is valid
in it, every formula from ∆0 is not valid in it. So this is a counter-model for
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0.
